Suchergebnisse

Arctic security is a main security challenge – a global one, not only a regional one – not only for the Arctic countries, but for the whole international community, first of all the European. With Russia and China expanding their role in the area, and the difficulty of finding an undisputed governance on maritime routes and economic exploitation of resources, there is the risk of militarization of the Arctic. After briefly summarizing current and future challenges in the Arctic, this paper analyzes the limits due to a deficit of suitable instruments to maintain security in the region, especially in relation to the role of international intergovernmental organizations, and suggests some remedies to overcome these deficiencies. ; Paper presented at the 7th Lisbon International Arctic Conference and Workshop, held at the Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas (ISCSP), Universidade de Lisboa (ULisboa), on December 13, 2019. The author gratefully acknowledges the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), Portugal, for supporting this research through grant SFRH/BD/136170/2018.

Alongside non-international and international conflict, a third category of armed conflict is emerging: hybrid, asymmetric, and transnational conflict which involve state and non-state actors such as insurgents or terrorist organizations. Unconventional conflicts are among the trend topics of defense and security, and they pose a threat to the stability of international order. States and international organizations, such as the UN and NATO, face difficulty using legal tools currently provided by international law, in particular international humanitarian law (IHL) and the law of war (Geneva and Hague conventions). The issue is how current international law applies or can be adapted to these conflicts. There are some questions to be fixed. First, we should find whether new rules are required to deal with situations of hybrid conflict, or if current rules are still valid and can be used/adapted. Secondly, we should determine whether IHL applies in transnational armed conflict against non-state groups, and if their members cease to be targetable during a pause in their active involvement, and whether there can be a non-international armed conflict which has no finite territorial boundaries with a non-state armed group operating transnationally. Lastly, we should assess whether attacks carried out by a transnational organisation and its affiliates meet the criteria of qualifying as a state of armed conflict under IHL. ; A poster (DOI:10.5281/zenodo.1992458) has been presented in the Poster Session (10h30–11h00 and 11h40-12h00, 12 Dec. 2018) in the atrium of the Amphitheater General Ivens Ferraz at the Instituto Universitário Militar (IUM), Lisboa, Portugal, and later published in the conference proceedings, together with an extended abstract of this presentation. This work received financial support by the European Social Fund (ESF) and by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), Portugal, under research grant SFRH/BD/136170/2018.

Arctic security is a main security challenge—a global one, not only a regional one—not only for the Arctic countries, but for the whole international community, first of all Europe. With the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China expanding their role in the area, and the difficulty of finding an undisputed governance on maritime routes and economic exploitation of resources, there is the risk of militarization of the Arctic. After briefly summarizing current and future challenges in the Arctic, this article analyzes the limits due to a deficit of suitable instruments to maintain security in the region, especially in relation to the role of international intergovernmental organizations, and it suggests some remedies to overcome these deficiencies.

The term "hybrid" gained widespread use in military and political discourse; it grabbed the headlines and eventually reached the general public. We refer to "hybrid warfare" or "hybrid conflict", most likely without fully comprehending the term's meaning and ramifications. The question is whether and when hybrid warfare should be regarded an armed attackthat exceeds the threshold of damage and devastation caused by a kinetic action. The purpose of this article is to provide light on the consistency of the growing doctrine of hybrid warfare with current international (humanitarian) law, beginning with a lexical and logical analysis of the words. ; This poster is derived from the paper Hybrid Warfare: Above or Below the Threshold of Armed Conflict?, to be published in the Hungarian Defence Review, Special issue, Vol. 149, No. 1., and presented at the international scientific conference on Soldiers and Hybrid War: The Role and Missions of Armed Forces in Below-Threshold Conflicts, held on 17-18 November 2021 at the Hungarian Defence Forces Zrínyi Miklós Barracks Theater, Budapest, Hungary. This work was supported by the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT) under grant No. SFRH/BD/136170/2018.

In 2014 a violent conflict inflamed Crimea, an autonomous republic within Ukraine, resulting in the destabilization ofregional security. The clash between the government of Kiev and the insurgents led to the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by the Russian Federation. This paper traces origins and causes of the conflict and tackles the issue of the right to self-determination and independence, then the question of the recognition of a new state entity, and finally the dissolution by incorporation into another state. Through a comparative analysis of some precedents, this article aims to investigate whether the annexation may be regarded as legal or not under international positive and customary law, what are the remedies available, and the likely outcome of the dispute, ending with some recommendations aimed at a settlement of the crisis. ; Paper presented on 13 July 2021 in panel RC17.15 'Foreign Policy and International Relations: Examining the Case Studies' within session RC17 'Comparative Public Opinion' at the 26th International Political Science Association World Congress (IPSA WC2021), held virtually on 10-15 July 2021. The participation in the WC2021 was funded by the Research Centre of the Institute for Political Studies of Universidade Católica Portuguesa (CIEP-UCP).The author gratefully acknowledges the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), Portugal, for supporting this work through grant SFRH/BD/136170/2018.

This study aims to shed light on the right to information and the freedom of the media in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak. Infection disease outbreaks are invariably characterized by myths and rumors, boosted by social media accounts, that media often pick up and circulate. Under the justification to avoid panic and confusion, and to combat "fake news" during the COVID-19 pandemic, some governments took emergency measures that curtail the freedom of information. The lack of a legal definition of the term "fake news" leaves room for arbitrary and broad interpretations. Decrees issued during the state of emergency – including the practice of detaining journalists for their work and the abuse of pre-trial detention and Internet censorship – sound like measures adopted to restrict the freedom of expression and the freedom of the media, and to shout down dissenting voices. Any kind of pressure against journalists has an immediate consequence, not only on them but also on the public's right to be informed. Media play a key role in providing important information to the public, and a pluralistic and vibrant media landscape is indispensable to any democratic society. Access to information and a free working environment are therefore essential and need to be ensured at all times, even under state of emergency. Authorities cannot invoke the state of emergency or national security as a motivation to suspend or limit fundamental human rights. The fight against COVID-19 can be a pretext for restricting civil liberties. ; Paper presented in joint session JS RN16- RN32: Subnational level perspectives on the governance of the pandemic at the 15th Conference of the European Sociological Association 2021 (ESA Conference 2021), Wednesday, 1 Sept. 2021: 12:30pm - 2:00pm CEST. Session Chair: Louisa Parks, University of Trento. This study was supported by the European Social Fund (FSE) and by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT) under research grant No. SFRH/BD/136170/2018. The participation in this conference was ...

Infection disease outbreaks are invariably characterized by myths and rumors, boosted by social media accounts, that media often pick up and circulate. On the grounds of protecting public health in the context of the covid-19 pandemic, some Member States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe imposed strict rules on the dissemination of "fake news". This paper reviews the outbreak communication principles established by the World Health Organization and checks the compliance of emergency legislation, adopted under the pretext of combating misinformation and disinformation, against fundamental human rights. ; This poster received financial support by the European Social Fund (ESF) and by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), Portugal, under grant SFRH/BD/136170/2018. The participation in this conference was funded by the Research Centre of the Institute for Political Studies of Universidade Católica Portuguesa (CIEP-UCP)

The freedom of the press –or the freedom of expression –traces its roots in the enlightenment period. Oftenpresented as the "fourth power" – sometimes as "counter-power" –free press is considered a feature of liberal-democracies, and a fundamental human right.This brief article explores the validity of these definitions and the role of the press in democratic societies characterized by governments constrained by checks and balances. Most of this paper draws on my previously published works. ; This work received financial support by the European Social Fund (ESF) and by the Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT), Portugal, under grant SFRH/BD/136170/2018.

Hybrid warfare — also known as grey zone conflict or low-intensity conflict — is a reality and political and military leaders must be ready to confront and deter it. There is no common definition of the term and therefore it is correspondingly ambiguous. It is an amorphous definition for an amorphous strategy. While it is a blend of traditional and irregular tactics, hybrid warfare makes overt and covert use of a wide range of tools: military and civilian, conventional and unconventional. Hybrid warfare is an umbrella concept, a form of comprehensive warfare, a strategy, that includes a buquet of tactics, techniques, technologies and methods. Hybrid warfare operations, for which it is difficult to attribute responsibility and which are not specifically regulated by international law, fall below the threshold of armed conflict. Hybrid warfare blurs the lines between peace and war and is therefore questioned whether it should be considered below the threshold of armed conflict. Some hybrid warfare operations are convenient because are located in a twilight zone between peace and war and below the threshold of war and therefore they should not trigger a conventional/kinetic military response. Nevertheless, at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, the allies recognized that international law applies in cyberspace and that the impact of cyberattacks could be as harmful as a conventional attack. As a result, cyberdefense was recognized as part of NATO's core task of collective defense. At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, the allies took further action to recognize cyberspace as a domain of operations just like the "classic" domains of air, land and sea. At the NATO summit held in Brussels in 2021, the allies reaffirmed that a cyber attack could trigger Article 5 of the Atlantic Charter: "an attack on one is an attack on all". This doctrinal position is of no small importance. The question is whether hybrid warfare should be considered an armed attack or use of force that, under treaty and customary international law, could trigger ...

In an era of increasing economic interdependence China is playing a growing role in the global economy, including in Europe, which presents both opportunities and challenges. This paper aims to analyze the different dimensions of an increasingly assertive Chinese presence in Europe from economics to politics and geo-strategy. The essay will address the China's Belt and Road initiative (BRI), the 'Made in China 2025' plan, the China 17+1 initiative and Trade disputes between China and Europe. It will also look at questions of technology competition and critical infrastructure investment. China's leaders announced in October 2017 that they want to assume a global leadership role. The long-term strategic competition with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is one of the major global economic, military and political challenges. Maritime policies play an important role in support of that strategy of making China a global leader. Today, Beijing is seeking to project sophisticated power globally, particularly in areas with heavy BRI activity – the plan for greater connectivity for China across both land and sea through a new Silk Road. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road affects Europe in five main areas: maritime trade, shipbuilding, emerging growth niches in the blue economy, the global presence of the Chinese navy, and the competition for international influence. It has been calculated that the Maritime Silk Road creates more competition than cooperation opportunities in Europe-China relations. The sea lanes of communication from China to Europe through the Malacca-Suez route are among the busiest in the world – where European interests are more immediate and bigger than on the nascent "Ice Silk Road": China-Europe maritime trade is three times larger than trade by air freight and Eurasian railways, while the last alternative – the Northern Route through the Arctic Ocean, that China dubs the "Ice Silk Road" – is only just starting to develop. In January 2018, the PRC published its first Arctic strategy that ...

The fall of the Berlin Wall, on the night of 9 November 1989, marked the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Distinguished scholars of the realist school have developed different theories on the root causes and predictability of the end of the Cold War and have sought to find whether the end of the conflict between the Western and the Eastern bloc was predictable, and under which terms it could be settled. ; Political Reflection, Vol. 7, No. 1 - Issue 26 (January-February-March 2021). The author gratefully acknowledges the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), Portugal, for supporting this work through grant SFRH/BD/136170/2018.

This poster addresses the employment of the Armed Forces in homeland security tasks. Unconventional conflicts – hybrid, asymmetric, and transnational conflicts which involve state and non-state actors such as insurgents or terrorist organizations – are among the trend topics of defense and security. Since jihadist terrorism broke out in in Europe, security has become a main concern, occupying the front pages of newspapers and the agendas of governments. Therefore, the debate on the employment of the Armed Forces in homeland security tasks became central. The primary responsibility for protecting life and property and maintaining law and order in the civilian community is vested in police forces; supplementary responsibility is vested by statute in specific agencies other than the Ministry of Defense. Military forces may be used to support law enforcement agencies. In emergency situations, the Parliament may authorize the use of the military as a police force on home soil. Police departments are much larger in major metropolitan areas and much smaller than the average in rural areas, but in catastrophic attacks that affect large areas in several states simultaneously, there will not be enough police officers to do what has to be done. Since lateral reinforcement is not feasible when all adjacent areas are involved, the only source of augmentation for local departments will be from the Armed Forces. Subsidiary operations of the Amy in support to civil authorities – e.g. military aid in the event of a catastrophe – are one of the ordinary duties of the Army, whose main mission is to ensure security and defense of the territory. Although the readiness of use for the defense of the territory is reduced, the maintenance and development of this important primary mission is to guard the long-term, in anticipation of events imponderables in the military and security policy. In Western liberal-democracies the executive power is limited in the use of the military in domestic security operations because of legal norms. ...

Military emerging disruptive technologies (EDTs) have a rapid and major effect on technologies that already exist and disrupt or overturn traditional practices and may revolutionize governmental structures, economies and international security. Margaret Kosal finds that military applications of EDT have even greater potential than nuclear weapons to radically change the balance of power.[1] The debate, stimulated by the Group of Governmental Experts on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems (GGE on LAWS) established by the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), has focused on artificial intelligence, cyber weapons and drones.[2] A broader discussion should include all military EDTs, inter alia: space and hypersonic weapons; directed-energy weapons/laser and photonic weapons, just to name a few. Though leaders have begun to become aware of legal and ethical implications of the military use of EDTs, these issues remain in the background: security concerns are of pivotal importance[3] and a most of the information and documents are kept confidential and their circulation is restricted.[4] This paper aims to investigate the compliance of military EDTs with international law, international humanitarian law, international human rights law and with ethical principles. [1] Kosal M.E. (ed.) (2019). Disruptive and Game Changing Technologies in Modern Warfare. Springer. [2] Brehm M (2017). Defending the Boundary – Constraints and Requirements on the Use of Autonomous Weapon Systems under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law. The Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Academy, Briefing No. 9; Jiménez-Segovia R (2019). Autonomous weapon systems in the Convention on certain conventional weapons: Legal and ethical shadows of an autonomy, under human control? REEI, 37, 1–33; Armin K (2009). Killer robots: Legality and ethicality of autonomous weapons. Ashgate. [3] National Security Commission on ...